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Counterfactual reasoning in time-symmetric quantum mechanics
D. J. Miller
Centre for Time, Department of Philosophy, Main Quad A14, University of Sydney NSW 2006, Australia∗
A qualification is suggested for the counterfactual reasoning involved in some aspects of time-
symmetric quantum theory (which involves ensembles selected by both the initial and final states).
The qualification is that the counterfactual reasoning should only apply to times when the quantum
system has been subjected to physical interactions which place it in a “measurement-ready condi-
tion” for the unperformed experiment on which the counterfactual reasoning is based. The defining
characteristic of a “measurement-ready condition” is that a quantum system could be found to
have the counterfactually ascribed property without direct physical interaction with the eigenstate
corresponding to that property.
I. INTRODUCTION
While standard quantum mechanics (SQM) involves
ensembles defined or preselected by the preparation state,
time-symmetric quantum theory (TSQT) [1], also re-
ferred to as the two-state vector formalism, involves en-
sembles both preselected by the preparation state and
postselected by considering only those cases which give a
chosen measurement outcome. In the context of TSQT,
Aharonov, Vaidman and co-authors [2, 3, 4, 5] have
drawn a number of interesting conclusions based on
counterfactual reasoning about different gedanken exper-
iments. From the beginning [6, 7], concerns have been
expressed about the legitimacy of the counterfactual rea-
soning involved in some of the conclusions in TSQT
[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Initially, there was
a misunderstanding on the part of some authors (for ex-
ample, [12]) that assertions about “elements of reality”
on the basis of the counterfactual reasoning were being
made in an ontological sense. It has now been made clear
that that is not the case and the counterfactual reason-
ing in TSQT has been defended [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. Re-
cently a new example reminiscent of the much-discussed
3-box example of time-symmetric counterfactual reason-
ing [1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26]
has been proposed [27] and discussed [28].
The counterfactual reasoning involved in TSQT relies
on the probabilities of SQM for the outcomes of succes-
sive measurements of a quantum system. The probabili-
ties were first considered by Aharonov, Bergmann and
Lebowitz [29] and the expression for the probabilities
is often referred to as the ABL rule. Kastner has em-
phasised the significance for counterfactual reasoning in
TSQT of specifying the observables that are considered
to be actually measured in the application of the ABL
rule and has concluded that the ABL rule cannot be used
in a counterfactual sense except in cases when the criteria
for consistent histories are satisfied [14, 15, 16, 17].
In the current work the significance of the observable
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involved in the ABL rule is taken into account in a specific
way but it is argued that the counterfactual reasoning
can be retained in all cases if it is subject to a qualifi-
cation. Some consequences of the suggested qualification
are then explored.
II. COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING
The counterfactual reasoning in TSQT can be dealt
with by considering two identical quantum systems, each
in its own copy of a complex Hilbert space H. One quan-
tum system is in the real world (RW) in which we live and
the other quantum system is in a counterfactual world
(CFW). For both quantum systems, the initial state at
time ta is the ray |a〉, an eigenstate of an observable A.
(Throughout the presentation, all states will be repre-
sented by rays inH because nothing turns on making that
simplification.) For the quantum system in the CFW a
measurement of observable C is made at time tc > ta,
and the counterfactual quantum system is found to be
in one of the non-degenerate eigenstates |ci〉 with corre-
sponding eigenvalue ci. For the quantum system in the
RW no measurement of C is made. For both quantum
systems, a measurement of observable B is made at time
tb > tc and only those cases are considered for which the
final state at time tb is the ray |b〉. That is, an ensemble
in the RW and an ensemble in the CFW are selected on
the basis that the initial state and the final states are |a〉
and |b〉 respectively.
The counterfactual reasoning involves attributing (un-
measured) properties ci to the quantum system in the
preselected and postselected RW ensemble with the same
probabilities as the probabilities for the outcomes ci of
measurements performed on the preselected and postse-
lected CFW ensemble. In the case that the probability
for an outcome ci in the CFW world is unity, ci is said
[19, 20] to be an “element of reality” (in a non-ontological
sense) in the RW.
It is apparent [7] that the ensembles selected by impos-
ing the above selection criterion in the RW and the CFW
are different conceptually and are usually also different
numerically. They are different conceptually because the
quantum system in the CFW is subject to an intermedi-
2ate measurement at time t and the quantum system in
the RW is not. They are different numerically when a
different proportion of all possible cases is selected into
the ensemble as a consequence of the measurement car-
ried out at tc in the CFW compared with the measure-
ment not being carried out in the RW. At the extremes,
if 〈a|ci〉 = 0 and/or 〈ci|b〉 = 0 then the preselected and
postselected ensemble will be empty in the CFW in which
ci is the outcome at tc, although the ensemble will not
be empty in the RW (unless 〈a|b〉 = 0). If 〈a|b〉 = 0,
the ensemble will be empty in the RW, although it will
not be in the CFW provided 〈a|ci〉 6= 0 and 〈ci|b〉 6=
0. Whether or not the differences between the ensem-
bles are significant has been the subject of discussion
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
For the purposes of the present work, it will be assumed
that the differences between the ensembles are not sig-
nificant.
Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz (ABL) [29] have
shown how SQM can be used to calculate the probabil-
ities of the sequence of measured properties a → ci → b
in what we have defined as the CFW. The conditional
probability that the outcome of the measurement of C in
CFW is ci at time tc, with ta < tc < tb, given the initial
state a at ta and final state b at tb is
PrABL[ci|a, C, b] = |〈a|ci〉〈ci|b〉|
2∑
j |〈a|cj〉〈cj |b〉|2
. (1)
The notation suggested by Kastner [15] has been adopted
in Eq. (1) (in a slightly modified form) to indicate ex-
pressly that a measurement of the observable C has been
made in the period between ta and tb.
Because the ABL rule involves a sequence of measured
properties, the quantum system in each measured state
must be left in an accessible form after the measurement
(except perhaps the final measurement) in order that the
subsequent measurements can take place. That condition
is satisfied by measurements of the first kind [30]. An es-
sential point is that, in order for example to carry out
the measurement of C and follow it by a measurement
of B, the quantum system must be subjected to a phys-
ical interaction which allows the eigenstates of C, other
than the desired state ci, to be filtered out. A possible
sequence is shown schematically in Fig. 1(a) where the
quantum system is prepared at time ta in the state |a〉,
is subjected to a physical interaction at time tc1 which
allows the subsequent measurement of C to take place at
time tc and is then subjected to a further physical inter-
action at time tc2 which allows the final measurement of
observable B to take place at time tb.
The sequence shown in Fig. 1(a) for performing the
measurement of C gives the same probability as any other
method of measuring C. The advantages of the method
shown in Fig. 1(a) is that (i) it allows (as required) the
subsequent measurement of observable B to take place
and (ii) once the physical interaction at tc1 has taken
place the measurement outcome ci involved in Eq. (2)
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FIG. 1: A possible sequence of physical interactions that could
be used for counterfactual reasoning about eigenstate |c3〉 of
observable C, given preselection for state |a〉 and postselec-
tion for state |b〉. (a) In the counterfactual world (CFW),
an experiment is actually performed with the outcome |c3〉.
(b) In the real world (RW), no experiment is performed but
it is here argued that counterfactual reasoning requires that
the quantum system be subject to the necessary preliminary
physical interactions which put it into a “measurement-ready
condition”.
can be obtained by blocking the states with j 6= i and re-
taining only the cases when a null result at each block is
obtained. Note that in the latter step, there is no direct
interaction with the state ci. Specifically, the Hamilto-
nian H representing the measurement of the states cj ,
j 6= i has no matrix elements with ci, i.e. 〈cj |H |ci〉 = 0
for all j.
For tc1 < t < tc the quantum system can be said to
be in a “measurement-ready condition” for observable
C. Placing the quantum system in a measurement-ready
condition involves a unitary time evolution. If the mea-
surement at tc is not carried out the measurement-ready
condition is reversible, for example by a choosing the
interaction at tc2 in Fig. 1(b) as the inverse of the inter-
action at tc1. On the other hand, the measurement of
ci which takes place in the CFW, involving the actual
blocking of paths for j 6= i, is a non-unitary process and
3is irreversible. The concept of a “partial measurement”
in the 3-box problem [17] seems to lie between these two
extremes.
In the way the counterfactual reasoning in TSQT has
been used to date [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22], the
probability in Eq. (1) is assigned to the quantum sys-
tem in the RW for the outcome ci of the (unperformed)
measurement of property C for the whole of the period
ta < t < tb. That is, it has been assumed that
PrRW[ci|a,−, b] = PrABL[ci|a, C, b] ta < t < tb. (2)
where PrRW[ci|a,−, b] indicates that the quantum sys-
tem in the RW has neither been measured for observable
C (unlike the quantum system in the CFW) nor placed
in a measurement-ready condition for the measurement
required for the ABL rule to apply in the CFW.
It is the purpose of the present work to suggest that
the relationship in Eq. (2) requires a qualification. The
qualification is that no inferences about the quantum sys-
tem in the RW can be drawn from experiments performed
on the quantum system in the CFW unless the quantum
system in the RW is subjected to a sequence of physical
interactions that places it in a measurement-ready con-
dition for the ABL measurements required to be carried
out on the quantum system in the CFW. That is, in or-
der for the counterfactual reasoning to apply in the RW,
the quantum system in the RW should be as shown in
Fig. 1(b) where the quantum system can be seen to be
in a measurement-ready condition for observable C in the
period tc1 < t < tc2. In those cases only, a property like
ci = c3 in the case shown in Fig. 1(b) can be ascribed
to the quantum system in the RW and then only for the
period tc1 < t < tc2.
The following definition is proposed:
Definition A Time-symmetric counterfactual reasoning
in relation to observable C is valid only in the time
period tc1 < t < tc2 when the quantum system in the
RW is in a measurement-ready condition for observable
C. A quantum system is in a “measurement-ready
condition” for observable C when it could be ascertained
whether or not the quantum system has the property
corresponding to any one of the eigenstates ci of C by
performing a measurement described by a Hamiltonian
which does not couple with ci.
Thus the counterfactual probability that an (unper-
formed) measurement on the quantum system in the RW
would yield the outcome ci is
PrRW[ci|a, (C), b] =
{
PrABL[ci|a, C, b] tc1 < t < tc2
undefined otherwise
(3)
where tc1 and tc2 are the beginning and end of the period
sometime during which the measurement is carried out
in the CFW. The notation (C) in Prob[ci|a, (C), b] means
that the quantum system is ready for a measurement of
C to be performed for tc1 < t < tc2 but the measurement
is not actually carried out in the RW. The measurement
is carried out in the CFW where, as a consequence, the
ABL rule can be applied.
There is a corresponding modification to the definition
of (non-ontological) elements of reality given previously
by Vaidman [20] as follows:
Definition B If the probability of the result C = ci of
a measurement of observable C at time t in the CFW
is unity, then there exists an element of reality C = ci
for a quantum system in the RW provided the quantum
system in RW is in a measurement-ready condition for
C at time t.
If the above conditions on counterfactual reasoning are
accepted, then some of the conclusions that have been
drawn from counterfactual reasoning in TSQT need to be
modified. The types of modifications are next identified
by considering several of the well-known examples.
III. APPLICATIONS
A. Dispersion-free values of non-commuting
observables
It follows from the ABL rule in Eq. (1) that
PrABL[a|a,A, b] = 1 and PrABL[b|a,B, b] = 1. From
counterfactual reasoning based on Eq. (2), that is with-
out confining the counterfactual reasoning about ob-
servable A (and similarly for B) to the period when
the quantum system is subject to the physical inter-
action required to be measurement-ready for the mea-
surement of A (and similarly for B), it has been con-
cluded [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] that since
PrRW[a|a,−, b] = 1 and PrRW[b|a,−, b] = 1, then the
quantum system in both the RW and the CFW must
have (in a non-ontological sense) definite, dispersion-free
values of both A and B (namely a and b respectively)
throughout the period ta < t < tb.
That result does not follow if Eq. (3) instead of Eq.
(2) is used for the counterfactual reasoning. The reason-
ing can be based on Fig. 1 by eliminating the physical
transformation for the intervening measurement of ob-
servable C, i.e. by making tc1 = tc2 in Fig. 1. From Eq.
(3), which is the present suggestion, the counterfactual
reasoning should be based on the following results
PrRW[ai|a, (A), b] =
{
1 ta < t < tc2
undefined t > tc2
(4a)
PrRW[bi|a, (B), b] =
{
undefined t < tc2
1 tc2 < t < tb
.(4b)
Therefore the only conclusion that can be drawn is
that property A = a is an element of reality for ta <
t < tc2 and property B = b is an element of reality for
tc2 < t < tb. Consequently, it cannot be said that the
quantum system has definite, dispersion-free values of
4the non-commuting observables A and B at any single
time. Non-commuting operators could never simultane-
ously be assigned definite, dispersion-free values on the
present approach because it is not possible to place the
quantum system in the RW (nor in the CFW) in a phys-
ical situation where the appropriate measurements could
be carried out at the same time.
One of the specific conclusions on the basis of the pre-
vious counterfactual reasoning has been that two non-
commuting components of the spin of a quantum system
can be ascertained at a given time on the basis of prese-
lection for one spin component and postselection for the
other [3, 4, 5, 22]. On the basis of the foregoing argument,
that conclusion must be invalid because it is impossible
to put a quantum system into a measurement-ready con-
dition for two components of spin at any single time. It is
preferable to have a theory that avoids the assignment of
definite, dispersion-free values to non-commuting observ-
ables because those values cannot in general satisfy the
same functional relationships that the observables them-
selves obey.
B. 3-box problem
In this gedanken experiment [2], the quantum system
in the RW and the CFW is described by a three dimen-
sional Hilbert space spanned by the rays |xi〉, i = 1, 2, 3
which can be thought of as representing occupancy of
three different boxes. The quantum system is prepared
(preselected) at ta in the state
|a〉 = 1√
2
(|x1〉+ |x2〉) (5)
and measured (postselected) at tb to be in the state
|b〉 = 1√
2
(|x2〉+ |x3〉). (6)
The 3-box problem involves the consideration of two
observables in the period ta < t < tb: observable X
with eigenstates |xi〉, i = 1, 2, 3 and observable Q with
eigenstates
|q1〉 = 1√
2
(|x1〉+ |x3〉) (7a)
|q2〉 = |x2〉 (7b)
|q3〉 = 1√
2
(|x1〉 − |x3〉). (7c)
(7d)
Counterfactual reasoning based on observable X.
One possible sequence of physical interactions that could
be used for the counterfactual reasoning for observable
X is shown in Fig. 2(a). For counterfactual reasoning
q3
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FIG. 2: (a) A possible sequence of physical interactions that
could be used for counterfactual reasoning for observable X
in the 3-box problem. Given the preselection for state |a〉 and
the postselection for state |b〉 as shown, the outcome |x2〉 for
the measurement of X in the CFW is certain and therefore
property x2 is an element of reality in the RW. (b) A possible
sequence of physical interactions that could be used for coun-
terfactual reasoning for observable X and/or of observable Q
with the common eigenstate |x2〉 ≡ |q2〉 . The transformation
at tq1 is the inverse of that at tq2. For a measurement of X
without Q in the CFW, the outcome |x2〉 or equivalently |q2〉
remains certain but for a measurement of Q with or without
X in the CFW, the outcome |q2〉 or equivalently |x2〉 is not
certain.
based on Eq. (3), the following properties hold in the
RW at the indicated times
PrRW[a|a,A, b] = 1 ta < t < tx1 (8a)
PrRW[x1|a,X, b] = 0 tx1 < t < tx2 (8b)
PrRW[x2|a,X, b] = 1 tx1 < t < tx2 (8c)
PrRW[x3|a,X, b] = 0 tx1 < t < tx2 (8d)
PrRW[b|a,B, b] = 1 tx2 < t < tb. (8e)
It follows that box or path x2 is an element of reality in
the above sense for the given preselection and postselec-
tion conditions during the period tx1 < t < tx2.
If the counterfactual reasoning is based instead on
5Eq. (2), the results in Eq. (8) apply but without the
time constraints. Using that approach as the basis of
the counterfactual reasoning, Albert, Aharonov and
D’Amato [2] concluded that the three non-commuting
observables A, X and B can be simultaneously well-
defined in the interval ta < t < tb. Clearly, that
conclusion does not follow if the counterfactual reason-
ing is based on Eq. (3) because none of the results for
A, X and B apply at the same time.
Counterfactual reasoning based on observables X and Q.
It also follows from the ABL rule in Eq. (1) that
PrABL[x1|a,X, b] = PrABL[x3|a,X, b] = 0 (9a)
PrABL[q1|a,Q, b] 6= 0. (9b)
It follows from counterfactual reasoning on the basis of
Eq. (2), i.e. without the constraint that the quantum
system in the RW be in a measurement-ready condition,
that
PrRW[x1|a,−, b] = PrRW[x3|a,−, b] = 0 (10a)
PrRW[q1|a,−, b] 6= 0. (10b)
As noted in Ref. 2, from Eqs. (7), the ray |q1〉 lies in
a subspace spanned by the rays |x1〉 and |x3〉. Eq. (10)
shows that it follows from the counterfactual reasoning of
TSQT that the probability of a property corresponding
to a ray (here |q1〉 ) in a subspace S can be non-zero
while the probability of properties corresponding to rays
which span S (|x1〉 and |x3〉 ) are zero. As a consequence,
it is argued in Ref. 2 that an assumption made in the
proofs of the theorems of Kochen and Specker [31] and
Gleason [32] (and also other “no-go” theorems [33]) is not
satisfied for quantum systems within the interval between
two measurements.
On the basis of the present approach, in order to con-
duct counterfactual reasoning based on observables X
and Q, it is necessary to put the quantum system in a
measurement-ready condition for both observables. A se-
quence of interactions like that shown in Fig. 2(b) is one
of the possibilities which are suitable for counterfactual
reasoning involving both observable X and observable
Q. It is clear immediately that, except for the common
property x2 ≡ c2, the properties pertaining to X and Q
do not apply to the quantum system at the same time.
It would seem for that reason alone, results like those in
Eq. (10a) could not be combined with that in Eq. (10b)
to draw counterfactual conclusions.
There is an additional reason that the conclusions of
Ref. 2 do not apply. Firstly it is important to note that
the transformation at tq2 is the inverse of the transfor-
mation at tq1, so if the quantum system were on path x1
at t < tq1 it must be on path x1 at t > tq2 if no measure-
ment of Q, i.e. of paths q2 or q3, is performed. Thus even
though the quantum system in the RW has been placed in
a measurement-ready condition for both X and Q, if the
counterfactual reasoning is based only a measurement of
X in the ABL rule applying in the CFW, the conclusions
will be the same as when the quantum system in the RW
had not been put in a measurement-ready condition for
Q, i.e. x2 remains an element of reality in that case.
On the other hand if the counterfactual reasoning is
based on a measurement of X and Q, the ABL rule for
more than 2 intermediate measurements [29] must be ap-
plied in the CFW. The measurement of Q in the CFW
means that the quantum system incoming on path x1
for t < tq1 may emerge at x1 or x3 for t > tq2. It
is then not the case that x2 is an element of reality
because there is a non-zero probability from the ABL
rule that the quantum system will follow the sequence
a → x1 → q1( or q3) → x3 → b and therefore the prob-
ability of the sequence a → x2(≡ q2) → b is not unity.
Consequently, the conditions in Eq. (9) do not apply be-
cause the probabilities of x1 and x3 are non-zero when
the probability of q1 is non-zero.
Thus if the counterfactual reasoning is conducted on
the basis of the definitions proposed here, the argument
about the 3-box problem in Ref. 2 referred to above
and its consequences for the well-known theorems do not
follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Counterfactual reasoning based on TSQT has been a
productive concept. It has been suggested here that the
counterfactual reasoning should be subject to a qual-
ification. The qualification is motivated by the fact
that the ABL formalism involves an intermediate mea-
surement or sequence of intermediate measurements be-
tween preparation and final measurement. Consequently
counterfactual reasoning based on the ABL formalism
should only be applied to a quantum system which has
been subjected to physical interactions so that it is in
“measurement-ready” condition for the measurement re-
quired for the ABL rule to apply in the CFW. One of
the characteristics which is unique to a “measurement-
ready” condition is that it could be ascertained, on some
repetitions of the experiment, that the quantum system
was in any one of the states that could be the outcome of
the measurement by monitoring the other possible out-
come states, i.e. without in any way disturbing the state
the quantum system was thereby found to be in. Of
course, that condition is met only on those repetitions
when the quantum system is not found in the other pos-
sible outcome states. It is important to re-iterate that
being put in a “measurement-ready” condition is a re-
versible process and the quantum system is not coupled
to a measuring device in the process.
The qualification means that counterfactual reasoning
in TSQT, or which is otherwise based on the ABL for-
malism, should satisfy Definition A, and Definition B
where appropriate, and be calculated according to Eq.
(3) rather than Eq. (2). Counterfactual reasoning based
6on Eq. (3) rather than Eq. (2) leads to more physically
reasonable results. It eliminates the ascription of simul-
taneous dispersion-free values to non-commuting observ-
ables and avoids conflict with a fundamental assumption
in the derivation of well-known theorems. Furthermore
definitions A and B above make the RW and the CFW
“closer” to each other, a desirable property for counter-
factual reasoning
The qualification of being “measurement-ready” in
Definitions A and B has not arisen in counterfactual rea-
soning before because it involves considerations unique
to quantum systems. A measurement of a quantum sys-
tem involves the quantum system being subjected to suit-
able physical interactions, after which a measurement of
a non-commuting observable cannot take place unless the
quantum system is subject to different physical interac-
tions. This necessity of subjecting the quantum system to
suitable, mutually exclusive physical interactions needs
to be reflected in the counterfactual reasoning. Therefore
counterfactual reasoning based on gedanken experiments
on a quantum system is only valid when the quantum
system has been subjected to the physical interactions
necessary for the gedanken experiment to be carried out
in principle. The same qualifications to counterfactual
reasoning are not necessary in the case of classical physics
because a classical system is in a measurement-ready con-
dition for any measurement at all times.
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